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I. INTRODUCTION
During my practice for the last twenty-six years, I have had the
opportunity to represent teachers through their membership in the
Nebraska State Education Association (NSEA) as well as participat-
ing in the legislative process that impacted their right of continuing
employment, or "tenure." This article relates some of that history, be-
ginning in approximately 1971.
Before commencing that discussion, it is important to note that
there were two separate teacher dismissal laws in Nebraska until
1971. One applied to Class IV and V school districts - Lincoln and
Omaha, respectively - and was codified in sections 79-1255 to 79-1262
of the Nebraska Revised Statutes (Reissue 1943). The other statutory
scheme applied to all other teachers employed by all other school dis-
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REviEw.
Partner in the Lincoln, Nebraska, law firm of McGuire and Norby; University of
Nebraska College of Law, J.D. 1973; University of North Dakota, B.A. 1968. I
have spent much of my professional life representing teachers, individually and
collectively, through their membership in the Nebraska State Education Associa-
tion. This article is dedicated to former Senator Gerald Koch, Chair of the Legis-
lature Education Committee from 1979 to 1982. Senator Koch's insights,
perseverance, and wisdom are largely responsible for the well-developed system
of teacher continuing contract law in Nebraska. Dedication is further made to
Mr. James R. Griess, Executive Director of the Nebraska State Education Associ-
ation, who for twenty-seven years has been a friend, a source of support, and
always a true teacher advocate. The Nebraska continuing contract law is part of
his legacy to Nebraska's teachers and education.
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tricts and was then codified as section 79-1254 of the Nebraska Re-
vised Statutes (Reissue 1943). This dual system operated without
much excitement for a good number of years, until 1971 when the Leg-
islature enacted 1971 Neb. Laws 266, which was intended to create a
"just cause" standard for termination of teachers in Class I, II, III, and
VI school districts. This article will track three major legislative en-
actments concerning teachers and their employment rights and how
the Nebraska Supreme Court has interpreted and interacted with
these legislative changes.
II. JUST CAUSE FOR TERMINATION: 1971-1981
In Schultz v. School District of Dorchester, County of Saline, Ne-
braska,' the federal Nebraska District Court abstained from deter-
mining whether the then existing form of Nebraska Revised Statutes
section 79-1254 (Reissue 1943) created a protectable property right by
assuring a teacher in a Class I, II, III, or VI school district continuing
employment, which could not be terminated without a determination
of just cause. The premise of the Court's holding was based on two
U.S. Supreme Court cases, then barely a year old. In Board of Regents
of State Colleges v. Roth, the United States Supreme Court stated
that:
A teacher has no constitutional right to a hearing before termination of a con-
tract of employment at the end of the contract period, unless there is at stake
the loss of "liberty" or "property."2
Property interests... are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings
that stem from an independent source such as state law - rules or under-
standings that secure benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those
benefits.3
A property interest must be more than a "mere subjective 'expectancy.'" 4
In its opinion, the Nebraska Court was swayed by the comments of
Chief Justice Burger in his concurring opinion in Perry v.
Sindermann,5 in which he stated that:
[Ihf relevant state contract law is unclear, a federal court should, in my view,
abstain from deciding whether [the teacher] is constitutionally entitled to a
prior hearing, and the teacher should be left to resort to state courts on the
question arising under state law.6
1. 367 F. Supp. 467 (D. Neb. 1973).
2. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
3. Id. at 577.
4. Id. at 469 (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972)).
5. 408 U.S. 593, 604 (1972).
6. Schultz, 367 F. Supp. at 472.
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Therefore, the Schultz Court abstained from deciding what it con-
sidered a question of state law and suggested that the Nebraska Su-
preme Court should resolve the issue.
On October 24, 1974, the Nebraska Supreme Court did just that by
addressing the issue of educational employment as property rights
and determined that the form of section 79-1254, R.R.S. 1943, as
amended by LB 266 in 1971, did not create a substantive right of con-
tinuing employment requiring a determination of "just cause" for the
lawful termination of the contract for teachers employed in Class I, II,
III, or VI school districts.
The form of section 79-1254 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes (Re-
issue 1943) before the Court in 1974 was amended by 1971 Neb. Laws
266 and provided:
The original contract of employment with an administrator or a teacher and a
board of education of a Class I, II, III, or VI district shall require the sanction
of a majority of the members of the board. Any contract of employment be-
tween an administrator or a teacher who holds a certificate which is valid for
a term of more than one year and a Class I, II, III, or VI district shall be
deemed renewed and shall remain in full force and effect until a majority of
the members of the board vote on or before May 15 to amend or terminate the
contract at the close of the contract period; provided, that the secretary of the
board shall, not later than April 15, notify each administrator or teacher in
writing of any conditions of unsatisfactory performance or other conditions
because of a reduction in staff members or change of leave of absence policies
of the board of education which the board considers may be cause to either
terminate or amend the contract for the ensuing school year. Any teacher or
administrator so notified shall have the right to file within five days of receipt
of such notice a written request with the board of education for a hearing
before the board. Upon receipt of such request the board shall order the hear-
ing to be held within ten days, and shall give written notice of the time and
place of the hearing to the teacher or administrator. At the hearing evidence
shall be presented in support of the reasons given for considering termination
or amendment of the contract, and the teacher or administrator shall be per-
mitted to produce evidence relating thereto. No member of the board of edu-
cation may cast a vote in favor of the election of any teacher when such
member of the board is related by blood or marriage to such teacher.7
The Nebraska Supreme Court was not troubled by the language in
the statute requiring the teacher to be advised in writing "of condi-
tions of unsatisfactory performance... which the board considers may
be cause to terminate or amend the contract for the ensuing school
year."8 The statute further defined what would be considered rele-
vant evidence for production at the hearing. "At the hearing evidence
shall be presented in support of the reasons given for considering ter-
mination or amendment of the contract, and the teacher or adminis-
trator shall be permitted to produce evidence relating thereto."9
7. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1254 (Reissue 1943).
8. Schultz v. School Dist. of Dorchester, County of Saline, 192 Neb. 492, 222 N.W.2d
578 (1974)(emphasis added).
9. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1254 (Reissue 1943).
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Again, the Court was still not persuaded that this statute required
"just cause" be proven even though the legislation's language man-
dated the production of relevant evidence for termination, i.e. facts
which would establish cause.1 0
Although the Court did not find these words to be ambiguous, it
nevertheless carefully reviewed the legislative history of 1971 Neb.
Laws 266. The Court's analysis of the legislative history primarily fo-
cused on comparing what the legislation provided upon actual passage
with what LB 266 stated in its original form.
As originally introduced, L.B. 266 required that the ultimate decision by the
board to terminate a contract must be based solely upon a deficiency constitut-
ing reasonable and just cause for such termination. That provision, however,
was excised by the Legislature from L.B. 266 as finally passed, and no longer
appears therein. We regard that fact as indicative of a legislative intent not to
place any limitation upon the boards of education in respect to the reasons for
which they decide to terminate teaching contracts. 1
The Court then held:
[Tihat section 79-1254, R.R.S. 1943, in its present form does not create in a
teacher employed pursuant to its terms a substantive right of continued em-
ployment by the school district requiring determination that reasonable and
just cause exists for termination of such employment. 12
Because of the Nebraska Supreme Court's holding, teachers in all
school districts other than Omaha and Lincoln were in effect "proba-
tionary" in that their employment could be terminated for any reason,
including no reason. Without a right to continued employment, ab-
sent the determination of just cause, these teachers had no protectable
property interest, thus no entitlement to procedural or substantive
due process.
The legislative response was swift. The following year, LB 82 was
heard before the Education Committee on January 20, 1975. On Feb-
ruary 18, 1975, LB 82 was advanced to "Enrollment and Review" for
engrossing (1975 Neb. Laws 82, page 752, Floor Debate) and signed by
Governor Exon on February 26, 1975.
While the Nebraska Supreme Court held in October of 1974 that
just cause was not required for teacher termination, the practitioners
of school law in the teacher termination area had, since 1971, applied
section 79-1254 as if just cause and its resultant property interest
were required elements for proper teacher termination. Thus in 1975,
consistent with the intent of LB 82, section 79-1254 of the Nebraska
Revised Statutes set forth and defined the requirement ofjust cause to
lawfully terminate a teacher's contract. 13
10. Schultz, 192 Neb. at 499, 222 N.W.2d at 583.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 500, 222 N.W.2d at 583.
13. Committee Statement, 1975 Neb. Laws 82, Committee Records.
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Although not part of the original bill, a floor amendment to LB 82
provided for a two-year probationary period. What the Legislature in-
tended by the language regarding the probationary period will become
significant as this history develops.
The first test of the "just cause" provisions of section 79-1254 re-
sulting from LB 82 was delineated in Sanders v. Board of Education of
South Sioux City Community School District No. 11.14 In the spring of
1976, Mrs. Sanders was in her sixth year of employment with the
School District of South Sioux City. Her March 23, 1976, evaluation
had an overall rating of "good," and her principal recommended re-
newal of her contract.' 5 The evidence adduced at the hearing against
Mrs. Sanders indicated that on several occasions students who should
have been in Mrs. Sanders' classroom were found elsewhere in the
school, on occasion gymnastic equipment was not properly safe-
guarded, and volleyballs were not properly secured.6
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the District
Court of Dakota County finding that there was no substantial evi-
dence of incompetency or neglect of duties sufficient to establish just
cause to terminate Mrs. Sanders' contract.1 7
The Sanders Court took this opportunity to give force and effect to
the "just cause" requirement as defined by LB 82, stating that:
Evidence that a particular duty was not competently performed on certain
occasions, or evidence of an occasional neglect of some duty of performance, in
itself, does not ordinarily establish incompetency or neglect of duty sufficient
to constitute just cause for termination. Incompetency or neglect of duty are
neither measured in a vacuum nor against a standard of perfection, but, in-
stead, must be measured against the standard required of others performing
the same or similar duties. The conduct of Mrs. Sanders complained of by the
board might well be categorized as minimal rather than substantial evidence
of incompetence or neglect of duty. However her performance of duty is classi-
fied, there is a complete absence of evidence that Mrs. Sanders' performance
of her particular duties was below the standard of performance required of
other teachers in the high school performing the same or similar duties.
Neither is there any expert testimony that Mrs. Sanders' conduct was, or
should be, sufficient evidence of incompetency or neglect of duty to constitute
just cause for termination of her contract. 1 8
Attorneys representing school districts reacted to Sanders by stan-
dardizing a litany of questions for use at a termination hearing to es-
tablish that their administrators were expert witnesses, that the
administrator had observed the performance of the teacher at issue,
and that the teacher did not meet the standard expected of other
teachers performing the same or similar duties. This approach be-
14. 200 Neb. 282, 263 N.W.2d 461 (1978).
15. Id. at 284, 263 N.W.2d at 462.
16. See id. at 285, 263 N.W.2d at 463.
17. See id. at 290-91, 263 N.W.2d at 465.
18. Id. at 290, 263 N.W.2d at 465.
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came known as the "magic questions" standard and seemed sanc-
tioned by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Davis v. Board of Education
of School District of Callaway,19 in which the Court found:
In the case now before us the testimony of the expert witnesses charged with
the duty of evaluating the performance of the teacher was that her perform-
ance did not meet the appropriate standard. They recommended that her em-
ployment be terminated and the evidence, including the expert testimony, as
a matter of law, was sufficient to support the action of the board in terminat-
ing her employment. 20
The Court in Davis went on to gratuitously provide that:
The language in Sanders with reference to a standard of performance should
not be interpreted to mean that in every hearing on termination before a
board of education there must first be expert testimony establishing the ap-
propriate and acceptable standard of performance before a board may con-
sider whether particular conduct falls below that standard. 2 1
In apparent reliance on the Court's analysis of the holding of Sand-
ers as set forth in Davis, the School District of Alliance attempted to
terminate Mr. James Hollingsworth in May of 1979.22 While the prin-
cipal testifying did not compare Mr. Hollingsworth's performance to
other teachers performing the same or similar duties, that failure was
not critical. 23 The Hollingsworth Court thoroughly analyzed all of the
evidence presented and not merely whether or not the right phrases
were uttered.24 Having done so, the Court concluded that "[iun build-
ing its case against Mr. Hollingsworth, the school board fashioned a
house of straw which cannot stand in the fresh breeze of careful
analysis."2 5
The Nebraska Supreme Court, after analyzing all of the evidence
presented at the termination hearing, concluded as follows:
Finally, a careful review of the entire record would indicate that for 21h years
Mr. Hollingsworth was a competent and industrious teacher. There is noth-
ing in the record to reveal what prompted the decision to ask for his resigna-
tion on January 31, 1979. It does appear that, from that date forward, the
administration commenced the systematic and diligent search for evidence
which would justify the decision which had already been reached. That search
has failed.26
The status of the law regarding teacher termination as of the
spring of 1981 was essentially that the Nebraska Supreme Court had
given true effect to 1976 Neb. Laws 266, particularly the statutory
language defining just cause. Hollingsworth gave meaning to the
19. 203 Neb. 1, 277 N.W.2d 414 (1979).
20. Id. at 3, 277 N.W.2d at 415.
21. Id.
22. See Hollingsworth v. Board of Educ. of the Sch. Dist. of Alliance, 208 Neb. 350,
303 N.W.2d 506 (1981).
23. Id. at 360, 303 N.W.2d at 512.
24. See id
25. Id. at 359, 303 N.W.2d at 512.
26. Id. at 361, 303 N.W.2d at 513.
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word "just" as used in the phrase 'just cause." This Court clearly sig-
naled that it would look at the substantive record made at a termina-
tion hearing and not simply at whether the right questions and the
right answers were given by school district's administrative prosecu-
tion witnesses. This approach is further reflected in Schulz v. Board
of Education of the School District of Fremont2 7 and in Drain v. Board
of Education of Frontier County School District No. 46.28
III. JUST CAUSE FOR TERMINATION: 1981-2000
Issues continued to linger, however, regarding the fact that the
School Districts of Omaha and Lincoln were governed by a different
set of statutory requirements than the other school districts. Also, is-
sues existed as to whether under the LB 82 amendments probationary
teachers were entitled to notice of possible termination and a hearing,
although without a standard of just cause.
LB 259 was introduced in January 1981. It proposed to reduce the
length of the probationary status of Lincoln and Omaha teachers to
two years and proposed a hearing process for probationary teachers.
The Education Committee heard initial debate on LB 259 on February
2, 1981. A month later, the Nebraska Supreme Court decided Meyer v.
Board of Education.2 9
The issue in Meyer was whether section 79-1254 of the Nebraska
Revised Statutes (Reissue 1943) required that notice of possible termi-
nation be given to probationary teachers and whether it entitled them
to a hearing before their employing board of education if requested.
The Court succinctly answered the question:
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-1254 (Reissue 1971) was amended by 1975 Neb. Laws,
L.B. 82, and the original sections were repealed. Legislative Journal (1975) at
599. As set out above, probationary teachers were excluded from the protec-
tion established by L.B. 82 and they are not included in the class of teachers
entitled to notice, a hearing, and just cause shown for termination of their
contracts.
3 0
Although LB 259 was not introduced as a response to Meyer as the
timing of the decision showed, it did come at a very appropriate time
in the legislative debate. Ten days earlier, the Education Committee
had voted to hold LB 259 in Committee for further study. The conse-
quences of Meyer were part of the issues needing resolution.
The interim study that followed to resolve these key questions was
led by the watchful eye and firm hand of Senator Gerald Koch, Chair
of the Education Committee. Participants in the interim study in-
cluded representatives from the School Districts of Omaha, Lincoln,
27. 210 Neb. 513, 315 N.W.2d 633 (1982).
28. 244 Neb. 551, 508 N.W.2d 255 (1993).
29. 208 Neb. 302, 303 N.W.2d 291 (1981).
30. Id. at 306, 303 N.W.2d at 293.
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Westside, and Millard, the Nebraska Council of School Administra-
tors, and the Nebraska School Board Association. I was pleased to be
a participant as counsel for the NSEA.
The study soon turned from an exchange of ideas to drafting a com-
promise bill. As mentioned, the significant issues involved the dispar-
ity in policy between Omaha and Lincoln and the rest of Nebraska's
teachers, the length of probation for a new teacher, and the type of
process due a probationary teacher prior to termination. In addition,
it was agreed that much of the undisputed Nebraska law involving
teacher termination issues would remain unchanged. While it may
seem this list of established precedent would be short, it was actually
quite involved. An example of this precedent was the case law that
required that a vote to terminate a teacher must be by a majority vote
of the board of education, rather than a quorum of the board, as estab-
lished by Houser v. School District of South Sioux City.31
Senator Koch was clear that the exercise would be successful, and
everyone was expected to compromise. As the designated drafter in a
pre-computer word processing era, it seemed that the compromise bill
was drafted and redrafted a hundred times. The "final draft" was
agreed to on Christmas Eve 1981.
A significant compromise in the draft concerned the time frame for
probation. In our draft, probation in Omaha and Lincoln would last
three years, it would no longer be extendable to four or five years in
Omaha and Lincoln, and probation would last two years for all other
school districts in the State. From the "final draft" of Christmas Eve
to the hearing on the modified bill on January 26, 1982, the State
School Board Association found it necessary to object to the two years
of probation due to input from its membership. Even though that is-
sue became an open one, the balance of the compromise included an
agreement that all parties involved, going forward, would not come
back in future years and attempt to change legislatively that which
upon agreement had been reached without the consent or acquies-
cence of the parties. To the credit of each entity involved, now nearly
twenty years later, this commitment has survived - truly a tribute to
all of those involved.
The length of probation became a major issue on the Floor as the
bill was debated. Accordingly, an amendment was adopted to increase
the length of probation to three years for all school districts by a vote
of 24 to 22.32
Over the lunch hour recess which followed the vote, Mr. James R.
Griess, now Executive Director of the NSEA, and I prepared a further
amendment. We were responding to the argument in support of the
31. 189 Neb. 323, 202 N.W.2d 621 (1972).
32. Legislative History of LB 82, March 3, 1982.
20001
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
need for a three-year probationary period. For example, Senator Goll,
who was promoting the three-year across-the-board amendment,
stated that "[an extra year would certainly give us an opportunity to
work with a teacher who is marginal to give them the necessary help
to improve their skills."33 The language we prepared was offered by
Senator Koch and was adopted as an amendment to the bill by a vote
of 23 to 6.3 4 That language is now codified in section 79-828(2) of the
Nebraska Revised Statutes (Reissue 1996) as follows:
The purpose of the probationary period is to allow the employer an opportu-
nity to evaluate, assess, and assist the employee's professional skills and work
performance prior to the employee obtaining permanent status.
All probationary certificated employees employed by Class I, II, HI, and VI
school districts shall, during each year of probationary employment, be evalu-
ated at least once each semester, unless the probationary certificated em-
ployee is a superintendent, in accordance with the procedures outlined below:
The probationary employee shall be observed and evaluation shall be based
upon actual classroom observations for an entire instructional period. If defi-
ciencies are noted in the work performance of any probationary employee, the
evaluator shall provide the teacher or administrator at the time of the obser-
vation with a list of deficiencies, a list of suggestions for improvement and
assistance in overcoming the deficiencies, and followup evaluations and assis-
tance when deficiencies remain.
If the probationary certificated employee is a superintendent, he or she shall
be evaluated twice during the first year of employment and at least once an-
nually thereafter.3 5
The remaining question was how the Nebraska Supreme Court
would interpret or apply this language. In 1997, some fifteen years
later, the Court dealt with this issue. Specifically, the issue focused
upon the consequence if a school district failed to evaluate a proba-
tionary teacher as the statute required and then attempted to termi-
nate that teacher.
York County School District No. 083 hired Ms. Kristin Cox as a
music teacher for the 1993-94 school year. Her first semester ended
January 14, 1994, and her first evaluation was January 28, 1994. Her
performance was rated as "satisfactory" in almost all areas, although
her "relationship with students" performance was rated as "needs
improvement." 36
On March 14, 1994, the Board of Education took action to renew
the contracts of all teachers except the contract for Kristen Cox. 37 Cox
was evaluated the next day. Again, her performance was rated as
33. Id. at 8157.
34. Id. at 8184.
35. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-828 (Reissue 1996).





"satisfactory" in all areas other than "relationship with students,"
which was still rated as "in need of improvement."3 s After a hearing,
the Board of Education of the School District voted against renewal of
her contract for the 1994-95 school year.3 9
The Nebraska Supreme Court determined that the School District
failed to follow the requirements of section 79-12,111(2) of the Ne-
braska Revised Statutes (Reissue 1994), because her teaching perform-
ance was not evaluated once each semester. Thus the decision not to
renew Cox's teaching contract, as reversed by the District Court, was
affirmed. It was gratifying to see the Nebraska Supreme Court con-
firm what Mr. Griess and I had intended as we drafted the statutory
language during that lunch hour some fifteen years earlier.
IV. REDUCTION IN FORCE
A collateral issue to traditional cause terminations occurs when
the "cause" given to justify termination is reduction in force, com-
monly referred to as a "RIF." A RIF normally occurs when a school
district finds it has too many teachers or more than it can afford due
to financial exigencies, a declining enrollment, or a change in educa-
tional program.
In 1979, the Nebraska Supreme Court considered Witt v. School
District No. 70, Frontier County.40 Mrs. Elaine Witt was an eight-year
special reading teacher employed by the School District. In the spring
of 1976, the school board voted to eliminate her position and termi-
nated her contract. Although she was certified and trained to teach
all elementary grades, the School District hired a new fourth grade
teacher. Mrs. Witt had been "considered" but apparently rejected for
the open position.4 1
The Court decided the case based on continuing contract law codi-
fied in section 79-1254 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes (Reissue
1943), stating:
It cannot be said there was a reduction in force when a new fourth grade
teacher was hired before the end of the term at which Mrs. Witt's contract was
terminated. We hold a tenured teacher whose position has been abolished has
a right to be retrained to fill any vacancy for which she is qualified for the next
school year which occurs after notice of the elimination of her position. In
other words, no new teacher may be hired to fill a vacancy she is qualified to
fill. To hold otherwise would simply allow a total emasculation of the tenured
teacher act.
An imaginative school board could simply transfer a teacher into a position it
knew it intended to abolish; abolish the position the following year; hold the
38. Id. at 14-15, 560 N.W.2d at 140.
39. Id. at 16, 560 N.W.2d at 141.




hearing; and terminate the position and the teacher's contract, even if a va-
cancy should occur for which she was qualified. While this may not have been
the intent herein, it does have that effect. The clear intent of the tenured
teacher act is to guarantee a tenured teacher continued employment except
for two justifiable circumstances: (1) discharge for a cause; and (2) reduction
in the teaching force. Neither is present in this instance. 4 2
The Nebraska Supreme Court reaffirmed Witt nine months later in
Moser v. Board of Education of School District of Humphrey43 and
again cautioned school boards from actions that would "emasculate
the intent of the tenured teacher act."44
Meanwhile, the Legislature passed 1978 Neb. Laws 375, which re-
quired every school district to have a reduction-in-force policy and to
establish a number of criteria that must be included in the policy. The
intent of the legislation was to delineate that something more compel-
ling is required than a mere claim of possible cost reductions to termi-
nate a teacher for reasons of reduction in force.45 This legislation
states that:
Before a reduction in force shall occur, it shall be the responsibility of the
board of education and school district administration to present competent
evidence demonstrating that a change in circumstances has occurred necessi-
tating a reduction in force. Any alleged change in circumstances must be spe-
cifically related to the teacher or teachers to be reduced in force, and the
board, based upon evidence produced at the hearing required by sections 79-
1254 to 79-1262, Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska, 1943, and amend-
ments thereto, shall be required to specifically find there are no other vacan-
cies on the staff for which the employee to be reduced is qualified by
endorsement or professional training to perform.4 6
The Legislature further provided a right of recall for teachers termi-
nated because of reduction in force to any position they were qualified
to perform by reason of Department of Education endorsement or col-
lege preparation.
The first test of a RIF policy's selection criteria occurred in
Dykeman v. Board of Education of the School District of Coleridge.4 7
The School District of Coleridge had the statutorily required reduc-
tion-in-force policy. One of the School District's justifications for re-
duction-in-force termination was a teacher's "[c]ontribution to the
activity program," which usually meant coaching.4 8
Mrs. Dykeman's argument was that because the Nebraska Su-
preme Court had ruled in Neal v. School District of York 4 9 that coach-
42. Id. at 68, 273 N.W.2d at 672.
43. 204 Neb. 561, 283 N.W.2d 391 (1979).
44. Id. at 564, 283 N.W.2d at 393.
45. LB 375 was enacted after the termination of Mrs. Witt and Mr. Moser, but before
the Nebraska Supreme Court decided its cases.
46. 1978 Neb. Laws 375.
47. 210 Neb. 596, 316 N.W.2d 69 (1982).
48. Id. at 598, 316 N.W.2d at 70.
49. 205 Neb. 558, 288 N.W.2d 725 (1980).
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ing was not teaching within the ambit of section 79-1254 of the
Nebraska Revised Statutes (Reissue 1943), coaching duties should not
be included as a criterion in a reduction-in-force decision involving a
teaching contract.5 0 The Nebraska Supreme Court disagreed. The
Court declared that school boards have the authority to conduct extra-
curricular programs as part of the educational program; thus a board
could consider a teacher's contributions to the school's activities as
part of the district's reduction-in-force policy.5 '
Interestingly, the Dykeman decision came fourteen days after the
Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in Schulz v. Board of Education of
the School District of Fremont,5 2 in which the Court thoroughly re-
viewed in detail the record in a "cause" termination and reversed the
decision to terminate a tenured teacher's contract.
A year later, the Nebraska Supreme Court decided Roth v. School
District of Scottsbluff.5 3 In Roth, the Court ruled in favor of Loretta
Roth, a tenured teacher, but reversed the lower court's decision for
Jane Montgomery because of her probationary status.
"Probationary teachers are exempted from every provision outlined in § 79-
1254..." (citations omitted). Thus, based on Meyer, we find that a probation-
ary teacher is entitled to none of the termination or rehiring benefits allowed
under §§ 79-1254, including the preferred rights to reemployment under § 79-
1254.07. Consequently, the trial court erred in awarding Montgomery dam-
ages based on her preferred rights to reemployment, for as a probationary
teacher, even one terminated due to a reduction in force, she has no reemploy-
ment rights under § 79-1254.07. Conversely, because Roth is a tenured
teacher terminated due to a reduction in force, she has preferred rights to
reemployment under § 79-1254.07.54
While there are no reported cases that directly involved reduction
in force decided from 1983 to 1988, our experience at the district court
level was that the rights of tenured teachers vis-a-vis probationary
teachers were generally protected and that school districts were held
to both statutory procedures as well as their own reduction-in-force
policies. However, there was little in-depth analysis of the basis for a
decision to terminate a teacher due to reduction in force.
In 1988, however, the Nebraska Supreme Court appeared to
tighten the requirements in reduction-in-force cases. In Trolson v.
Board of Education of School District of Blair,5 5 the Court gave mean-
ing to the statutory language that an alleged change in circumstances
must be specifically related to the teacher affected. Because the
School District's reduction-in-force policy was not offered into evidence
at the termination hearing, the Nebraska Supreme Court found:
50. Dykeman, 210 Neb. at 598, 316 N.W.2d at 70.
51. Id.
52. 210 Neb. 513, 315 N.W.2d 633 (1982).
53. 213 Neb. 545, 330 N.W.2d 488 (1983).
54. Id. at 547-48, 330 N.W.2d at 490 (citations omitted).
55. 229 Neb. 37, 424 N.W.2d 881 (1988).
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The record tells us only the factors considered in selecting Trolson's contract
as the one to be amended; there is nothing to show that the factors were used
in accordance with whatever the policy may be. Thus, the evidence does not
meet the requirement that the evidence produced at the hearing establish
that, among other things, the change in circumstances necessitating a reduc-
tion in force specifically relate to Trolson. 5 6
In the same year, Laura Kennedy was a probationary teacher in
the School District of Ogallala, which attempted to end her employ-
ment for reduction-in-force reasons. "Kennedy also requested a com-
plete listing of all reasons to be offered as a basis for terminating her
contract, a list of all witnesses to testify on behalf of the administra-
tion or School District, a summary of their testimony, and copies of all
documents to be used as exhibits."57 The School District denied her
request, because as a probationary teacher, she was not entitled to the
same procedural process given to a tenured teacher. The Nebraska
Supreme Court, however, determined she was entitled to the re-
quested information and, in doing so, offered this explanation:
The board responds to Kennedy's claim that the notice she was given preced-
ing the hearing was inadequate by reminding us that in Roth v. School Dist. of
Scottsbluff, 213 Neb. 545, 330 N.W.2d 488 (1983), we held that the rights
granted to tenured teachers by former Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 79-1254 to 79-
1254.08 (Reissue 1981) did not apply to probationary teachers. The legal real-
ity is, however, that much of what was said in Roth has been superseded by
subsequent legislative enactments. While the Legislature has not yet obliter-
ated all distinctions between probationary and permanent employees, it has
unquestionably given probationary teachers greater protection than they for-
merly enjoyed and has thereby correlatively limited the power of boards of
education over them. See [sic], Trolson v. Board of Ed. of Sch. Dist. of Blair,
229 Neb. 37, 424 N.W.2d 881 (1988); Nuzum v. Board of Ed. of Sch. Dist. of
Arnold, 227 Neb. 387, 417 N.W.2d 779 (1988). 5 8
Thus the intent of 1982 Neb. Laws 259, which provided meaningful
hearing rights to probationary teachers, was given full effect by the
Nebraska Supreme Court in Kennedy. The case of Cox v. York County
School District No. 08359 relies in part upon the foregoing "oblitera-
tion" language from Kennedy. Therefore, part of what was sought leg-
islatively in 1981 with the introduction of LB 259 regarding
probationary teachers was affirmed by these decisions.
V. FINAL OBSERVATIONS
The arena of teacher termination law has matured and become
quite civil over the last three decades. School districts and their
boards of education have learned that proving "just cause" is required
56. Id. at 42, 424 N.W.2d at 884.
57. Kennedy v. Board of Educ. of Sch. Dist. of Ogallala, 230 Neb. 68, 70, 430 N.W.2d
49, 50 (1988).
58. Id. at 72, 430 N.W.2d at 51.
59. 252 Neb. 12, 560 N.W.2d 138 (1997).
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to terminate or cancel a teacher's contract and is not as erroneous as
once feared - although none like the process. Similarly, having to give
a probationary teacher notice of possible non-renewal and the oppor-
tunity for a hearing if requested has not been paralyzing. In fact, few
probationary teacher hearings are actually held. Part of this mellow-
ing process is attributable, in my opinion, to a different generation of
school administrators. Current school administrators were young
teachers twenty to thirty years ago and grew up professionally in a
world of due process and fair dismissal. Those concepts are not inher-
ently repugnant to them as was true a generation earlier.
In 1981-82 when we were working on the LB 259 interim study,
Dr. Carroll Sawin was an active participant on behalf of the School
District of Lincoln. He told me then what I believe now most school
administrators endorse as part of their professionalism. His wisdom
was that "[ilf I can't 'counsel out' the probationary teacher having
problems, then I am not doing my job." "Counseling out" now better
defines the philosophy of the system, in contrast to the confrontational
attitudes school administrators had in the past.
When hearings are held on the issue of the non-renewal of the pro-
bationary teacher, I recall the wisdom the Honorable Warren Urbom
expressed in Rozman v. Elliot - "Even an imperfect hearing, if held
with the approval of the employee, is better than no hearing at all."60
This is what probationary hearings are all about. Albeit imperfect
and in a forum where the moving party has no burden of proof, proba-
tionary teachers have their opportunity to be heard.
This area of school law, while imperfect, is understood and works.
Part of that is due to consistency and the absence of competing legisla-
tive efforts by one side or the other to gain an advantage. This impor-
tant underpinning of the Nebraska process is a direct result of the
commitment extracted by Senator Gerald Koch in 1981 and respected
by all concerned parties since then. Thank you for your wise foresight,
my friend.
60. 335 F. Supp. 1086, 1100 (D. Neb. 1971).
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